Neocolonialism Embedded In The Eu Deforestation-Free Products Regulation (EUDR)

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) plays a historical and contemporary role in the expansion of resource extraction and exploitation at the expense of socio-ecological diversity in the production territories. Europe’s high demand for cheap food in particular can be traced back to the configuration of a hierarchy of food production, processing and consumption created by those in the colonial metropole at the expense of those at the end of the global food system. 

Since its adoption, the EU Deforestation-Free Products Regulation 2023/1115 (EUDR) has been hailed as a pioneering measure, in line with the EU’s broader plan of action to tackle deforestation and forest degradation outlined in the 2019 Commission Communication on Stepping up EU Action to Protect and Restore the World’s Forests. The European Commission, in particular, recognises that: “as a major economy and consumer of these commodities linked to deforestation and forest degradation, the EU is partly responsible for this problem and it wants to lead the way to solving it”. In doing so, the EU is essentially going beyond the idea that geographical and legal distance deflect political and legal responsibility, and that public authorities have no involvement with operations at the origin of Global Value Chains (GVCs) that end in their markets.

Although the acknowledgment of the role of EU citizens and companies’ behaviours in generating a global problem represent a milestone and should not be discounted, this article argues that the EU’s discourse around the EUDR (but also the broader greening agenda contained in the EU Green Deal) does not go beyond the acknowledgment of the problem. In fact, we contend that the EU recognises but fails to address Europe’s historical role in ecological breakdown resulting from the pursuit of intensive and cost-effective production systems in other territories and normalises global commodity production as inevitable and desirable. Therefore, this article critically highlights some of the underlying neocolonial aspects in the EU’s new regulation, both in terms of the foundational epistemic assumptions and proposed interventions. In this contribution, we argue that the concerns regarding Europe’s contribution to global deforestation and forest degradation cannot be improved with the promotion of ‘greener’ commodities and ‘sustainable’ trade, because such practices would simply deepen the influence of a historically dominant development model and hegemonic food system rooted in colonial history.

2. Disclosing Neocolonialism within the EUDR

2.1  A Neoliberal And Profiting From Nature Mentality

The European colonial empire has built upon an European-centred rule, replicating universal truths about human-nature relations, asymmetrical power politics and terms of economic trade policy. The EU trading bloc has historically pushed for cultural and socio-economic shifts aimed at reproducing production and distribution systems that facilitate the overconsumption of resources by European powers. Decades of the ‘Global North’ meddling in the ‘Global South’ have not only erased other forms of knowledge and ways of life in territories, essentially constructing nature as something for the taking, but also nurtured unequal material exchange relations, where the ‘Global North’ appropriates resources and economic surplus from other territories. Specifically, the model of global production and distribution of agricultural commodities established by the EU over centuries has disrupted and continues to disrupt the regenerative capacities of the people(s) and the planet, significantly contributing to the intensification of ecological disorder and the state of climatic and ecological emergency that most territories around the world are experiencing. Moreover, through FTAs and the historical promotion of large-scale agricultural production reliant on imported commodities, the EU has actively entrenched the ‘Global South’ as an extractive economy, leading to subsequent environmental burdens and social costs in those territories. Therefore, the pursuit of cheap deforestation-inducing commodities perpetuates a process often colonial in character, rooted in resource exploitation and unequal power dynamics between regions. Deforestation in this sense is mostly a “symptom of deep-rooted inequities in the global economy”.¹

Akin to other EU ‘green policies’, the EUDR however fails to address the above and rather builds upon it. Historically rooted causes of deforestation, including colonial practices, violence, material plunder and the appropriation of natural resources by global powers are not addressed by the regulation. Not only does the regulation fail to confront these issues, but it also sidesteps addressing the deepening hegemony of resource imperialism and global division of labour, perpetuating the idea that the ‘Global South’ operates as an extractive economy for the provision of the industrialised north. Essentially, the construction of ‘green discourses’ by the Commission confuses the pursuit of liberal development policies with sustainable and green development: one becomes a function of the other. Efforts to address deforestation and forest degradation resulting from EU consumption are translated into policies and actions (e.g. support to market-oriented practices, support to smallholders in value chains, partnerships towards greater ‘sustainable commodity production’, etc.) that do not question the modernising project itself, including inequalities embedded in production, trade and consumption of commodities that drive deforestation. Similarly, the EU pursuit of deforestation-free products doesn’t align with trade policies and dynamics that favour economic interests, intensifying dependency relationships and reinforcing the bloc’s dominance in the global hierarchy.² However, when the root causes of deforestation are dismissed, it is not only deforestation and forest degradation that are allowed to continue, but also deeper inequalities at the heart of the system.

2.2  Continuation of Epistemic and Ontological Injustices 

Along the lines of other EU ‘green policies’ aiming to position the EU as a global leader in climate action, the new deforestation-free products regulation aspires to exert influence on deforestation-free policies worldwide. The EUDR has been consistently labelled by EU proponents as the ‘most ambitious’ and ‘avant-gardiste’ piece of legislation, by opposition to existing deforestation-free policies such as the UK Environment Act, boasting a robust framework to address deforestation and forest degradation. Essentially, through the EUDR, the EU seeks to set new standards to combat deforestation and forest degradation and trigger a ‘norm cascade‘. In this sense, the discourse on the significant role of the EU in tackling deforestation and forest degradation has been actively promoted by EU officials but has also garnered support from influential European environmental and human rights organisations. However, we contend that this diffused and laudable stance tends to overlook the risk of strengthening the current Eurocentric hegemony while suppressing any discourse that would run counter the existing framework of greening GVCs and global capitalism. Moreover, while EU actors portray themselves as the epitome of ‘global sustainability’ and foster a perception of European exceptionalism, this narrative diverts attention from some of the primary drivers of deforestation. Several elements from the regulation come to underline the above concerns.

• First, the EU articulates the need to prevent deforestation and forest degradation (and biodiversity loss and climate change) using a typical colonial lens of environmental protection that largely ignores different ways of living and knowledge systems (e.g. slash and burn practices). The former are sacrificed at the expense of ‘better governance’ means and understanding of sustainability based on EU standards.³ Although it is not surprising that the Eurocentric vision of human-nature relations dominates the process, the lack of attention given to different understandings of nature and forests by indigenous peoples, local communities, farmers and peasants undermines the objectives of the EUDR to tackle global deforestation and forest degradation dynamics. This narrative overlooks unjust colonisation of customary lands and the imposition of a specific vision of the way in which land should be used – profitably for export-, at the expense of indigenous peoples, local communities, farmers, peasants and other groups in those territories.⁴ Furthermore, this mindset not only legitimates but also exacerbates the exploitation and dominance of territories by the EU under the guise of pursuing practices ostensibly free from deforestation. In doing so, epistemic and ontological injustices are reproduced, wherein certain knowledge systems, perspectives, and ways of life are marginalised. 

• Second, the EUDR regulatory intervention has been justified in the name of general improvement, positioning the bloc as a ‘force for good’ while others are in constant need of ‘catching up’ with international standards. For instance, the country benchmarking system operates through a process of country categorisation and the creation of hierarchies. In essence, although the mechanism is ultimately designed to enable EU member states authorities to impose different checks on operators based on the risk level associated with the country, the EU also perceives it as an incentive for producer countries to improve the ‘sustainability’ of their agricultural production systems and minimise their impact on deforestation. Discussions with EU officials have brought to light that the Commission frames the mechanism as an ‘opportunity’ for partner countries classified as high risk to engage in cooperation with the Union. This entails fostering cross-border dialogues beyond the EUDR’s framework, with the aim of establishing links between the regulation’s political objectives, wider ‘sustainable’ forest systems, and ‘sustainable food systems’, as defined by the EU. In doing so, the EU essentially emphasises the “win-win” prophecy in which trading partners find themselves if they subjugate to the EU green standards. 

• Third, the EU is essentially framing deforestation as linked to a set of governance challenges, and positions other countries as needing improvement in their regulatory framework in order to achieve the higher position of the EUDR. For example, the EU foresees partnerships and international cooperation with producer and consumer countries as important steps to promote ‘sustainable’ production and consumption patterns globally. Specifically, Article 30 EUDR foresees the Commission as playing a substantial role in the creation of a ‘global level playing field’ by engaging in a coordinated approach with producer countries, including through structured dialogues, administrative arrangements, and existing agreements. Emphasis is placed on the EU’s imperative to strengthen partnerships and cooperation, to “support or initiate inclusive and participatory dialogue towards national legal and governance reform processes to enhance forest governance and address domestic factors contributing to deforestation” (emphasis added). By doing so, the EU positions itself as a ‘moral intervener,’ actively engaging in peripheral countries in response to what is perceived as deficient and climatically unambitious policies in need of capacity-building towards EU self-defined environmental ambitions. As soon as the EU decides to undertake ‘sustainable’ principles and tackle climate issues, a moral dualism emerges between an entity that upholds the norm and one that is to be encouraged, between a know-how power and one that does not. This narrative perpetuates a dependency relationship between the EU and other countries while suggesting the possibility of establishing a level playing field despite uneven economies and underlying structural issues. Similarly, discussions with EU officials highlighted that the EU restrained involvement of third countries in the EUDR discussions with the goal of upholding a ‘zero deforestation approach’ but also avoiding reliance on the definition provided by local laws, which they see as unreliable given potential changes over time. Such perspective, however, overlooks the efforts already undertaken by countries and national actors to achieve higher standards than those set by the EUDR. 

It is therefore not surprising that a number of producer countries addressed concerns over the regulation’s content, in particular expressing a sense of neocolonial and unilateral imposition from the EU. Solidarity of positions and visions between the EU and other countries is essentially put to test when green discourses are universalised in a way that is decontextualized from historical and differentiated responsibilities, and from an understanding of the socio-economic impact on local and territorial dynamics. Those countries notably expressed dissatisfaction with the regulation, including the choice of an unilateral legislation instead of an international engagement, as well as the disregard for local conditions, existing national legislations and efforts to fight deforestation. In particular, they have expressed their views that the EUDR is a punitive measure, targeted at countries with tropical forests, impeding their capacity to pursue economic development through their natural resources. Those countries also recalled the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) and the EU’s own historical role in deforestation activities and climate change.

2.3. Dismissing common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) 

The need to protect ecosystems and forests around the world has been reaffirmed by world leaders on a number of occasions. In particular, the EU’s discourse underscores current and future responsibility to mitigate global deforestation and forest degradation linked to its consumption of specific commodities.⁵ Yet, the regulation misses a serious engagement with the responsibility associated with it, dismissing the principle of CBDR-RC enshrined in the UNFCCC Treaty and the 2015 Paris Agreement. As the principle recognises, it is not enough that states recognise the common responsibility in addressing the current environmental crisis, but the historical and differentiated responsibility for the primary role of industrial countries in environmental degradation, along with the different capacities of states to act in response. Adhering to this principle and duly considering it would have necessitated the consideration of distinct requirements.

First and foremost, an adequate respect of the CBDR-RC principle would require the EU not to regulate global dynamics without adequately addressing its historical role in the ecological breakdown that it is willing to amend. The EU should not aim at building a ‘green level playing field’ without adequately recognising the unevenness of a playing field built on colonisation and economic dependency, and without actively participating in the construction of evenness by means of redressing historical responsibilities and the implications of the continuous appropriation of value and resources extracted in the Global South. However, the EUDR imposition of a temporal benchmark means the regulation is created as a prospective tool, exclusively tackling deforestation and forest degradation from December 30, 2020, onward, thus overlooking the historical role of the EU in global deforestation, intertwined with Europe’s colonial legacies overseas, and dismissing the clear continuities and legacies of deforestation. Even if the regulation was to effectively reduce deforestation associated with products entering the EU market, the EU still bears responsibility for its past imports. 

This point is further reinforced by the measures that are proposed at the heart of the regulation. Indeed, the principle of CBDR-RC would require that the relative positions of producers in emissions and in trade take into account the differences in capabilities resulting from different levels of development. However, two observations arise from our research. Firstly, the regulation does not consider varying capacities and fails to distinguish between different countries (i.e. one size-fits all approach; international and common definition of deforestation; etc.). Secondly, it could be expected to see industrialised countries compensate less-industrialised countries for their efforts in reducing carbon emissions from forest-based sources, notably supporting laws, institutions and policies in this regard. Nonetheless, although the regulation pledges for new partnerships with producer countries (Article 30 EUDR), the allocation of resources by EU delegations to partner countries remains vague, and mostly oriented towards supporting çiiimarket-based practices.

Lastly, equity and self-determination stand as core principles within the global climate policy regime and with the principles of climate justice as recognised in the preambles of the Paris Agreement and the latest IPCC report. However, the unilateral imposition of an European solution to reducing global deforestation and forest degradation places an inequitable burden on producing countries, which have raised numerous objections regarding the provisions outlined in the regulation, including national sovereignty, economic growth and impact on local communities⁶. Indeed, although the EU looks to national deforestation laws to give content to the underlying legality standard, the regulation functions as a unilateral regulation, applying demand-side restrictions and a universal zero-deforestation standard to trading partners. In addition, as evidenced by the interviewees we conducted, discussions concerning the adaptation of the regulation to national priorities and peculiarities have been avoided, and demand-side restrictions have been grounded in a “There Is No Alternative” (TINA) stance and the perceived urgency to act swiftly. From an utilitarian perspective, this also questions the effectiveness of the regulation as previous research has shown the importance of the domestic regulatory context for the effectiveness of new environmental due diligence laws.⁷

3. Conclusion 

The recent adoption of EUDR marks a significant step in acknowledging the EU’s role in global ecological degradation. However, as this contribution has underlined, it falls short of addressing the underlying historical and systemic issues perpetuating socio-ecological inequalities. The EU narrative on deforestation and forest degradation ignores existing and historical power asymmetries, unequal exchanges and material inequalities, and embodies limited recognition and empowerment of local actors and their right to self-determination. 

Part of the problem stems from the EU attempts to enhance and direct state action to tackle deforestation and forest degradation based on its own ‘deforestation’ standards. But that is not all. Little is proposed in the EUDR to confront EU’s consumption of cheap agro commodities – such as reducing its reliance on exported commodities – as important factors of deepened inequality and environmental destruction in peripheral territories. The regulation perpetuates a more general and complex picture of injustices historically constituted from the local to the national level and materialised in global agricultural chains that counted on massive deforestation and the role of the Global South as the provider of raw materials for the North.⁸

From a decolonial perspective, the construction of a deforestation-free world should not just be about limiting the trade in deforested goods. Rather, it should start with meaningful reparation and restoration for the violence of the past, in a way that does not only provide economic rewards but creates the conditions for a future world that does not look anymore like the one that policies try to mitigate. This, to use the words of Walter Rodney, requires the recognition of the pivotal role that the ‘Third World’, its people and resources played in the construction of Europe, while remaining ‘underdeveloped’, and therefore bring to an end the politics of domination and exploitation that is also visible in the universalist attitude of the EUDR. Third, a structural and decolonial approach requires addressing deforestation as an intersectional issue that encompasses racial, gender, and economic justice, and that cannot be addressed by simple means of sanctioning and creating ‘green’ global trade agri-food routes.

Deforestation, forest degradation and biodiversity loss should be viewed as a global systemic phenomenon that has to do with the wealth in Europe and other Western countries more than they have to do with producing countries’ lack of governance or accountability. Recognising the interrelationship between territories, deforestation and their integration into GVCs driven by international trade is crucial.⁹ In this sense, addressing deforestation and forest degradation should be embedded in broader considerations, rethinking laws and neoliberal policies that lock territories in GVCs that in turn offer limited space for economic and political alternatives. Importantly, regulatory interventions tackling climate change, biodiversity loss and global deforestation should not be solely driven by EU internal considerations or political dynamics that perpetuate the exploitative human-nature interactions inherent in a capitalist, growth-focused economy, but rather towards a rectification of unequal ecological and economic exchanges.

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